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Abstract 
Uncertainty is a fact of project life. Most decisions that are made on a safety-critical project 
involve uncertainty, the consequences of which may be highly significant to the safe and 
timely delivery of the project.  Based on interviews with project management practitioners on 
9 large-scale civil nuclear and aerospace projects, we explore how uncertainty emerges, and 
how project management practitioners identify, analyse and act on it. We make three 
important contributions.  First, we present three approaches - structural, behavioural and 
relational - that individuals and organisations can adopt when contending with project 
uncertainty.  Secondly, we characterise nine dualities at play in the management of project 
uncertainty and thirdly we identify key differences between how civil nuclear and aerospace 
project managers confront project uncertainty, which have important implications for how 
projects might be organised in both these industry sectors. Drawing attention to the structural, 
behavioural and relational approaches to project uncertainty and the tensions that manifest 
themselves in each approach should enable the project management community to make 
progress in environments of high uncertainty where situations are often complex, rapidly 
changing and confusing, and yet where, for reasons of safety, failure is not an option.    
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1. Introduction 
Project management as a field of study has moved from a deterministic view of projects as 
concrete entities delivering well-defined objectives on time and to budget (Meredith & 
Mantel, 2010) to a more expansive understanding of projects as complex emergent problems 
that often proceed under high levels of uncertainty (Havermans, Keegan, & Den Hartog, 
2015; Morris, 2013; Winter, Smith, Morris, & Cicmil, 2006).  In this new world, the 
individuals tasked with delivering projects must navigate their way through myriad 
uncertainties – in scope, stakeholder demands, organisational and technological complexities 
– acknowledging that uncertainty is a fact of project life (Böhle, Heidling, & Schoper, 2015; 
Cleden, 2009; O’Connor & Rice, 2013).   
The challenges presented by uncertainty are magnified in large-scale safety-critical projects 
where project failure may result in reputational damage, loss of public confidence and long 
term physical damage; witness the severity of the environmental and reputational damage to 
BP caused by the Macondo Well blow-out in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010 (US Chemical 
Safety Board, 2015).  Safety-critical projects are defined as those where safety is of 
paramount importance, and where the hazards to be controlled can harm the environment, 
personnel or the public (Wears, 2012).  Reiman, Rollenhagen, Pietikäinen, & Heikkilä (2015) 
argue that safety-critical projects constitute a distinct context of projects as, for example, the 
hazards of nuclear power generation (which involves the heating up of water, either directly 
or indirectly by nuclear reaction in order to generate electricity by passing steam through a 
turbine) differ greatly in magnitude from the hazards of a typical construction site.  In safety-
critical projects, such as those to decommission former civil nuclear assets or develop aircraft 
made of exotic composite materials, project managers have to deliver ultra-safe project 
outcomes.  They must achieve this despite operating in a complex socio-technological 
environment replete with many layers of regulation; and within constrained budgets and finite 
numbers of skilled human resources.  Uncertainty in these large-scale projects is an ever 
present, if often unwelcome, companion.  It arises from the earliest stages of project 
inception, when uncertainty about scope and delivery mechanisms may be overwhelming, to 
the project end-game when new facilities must be commissioned in a timely manner.  Amidst 
these uncertainties, project managers must remain calm and in control; demonstrating 
confidence and competence, whilst wrestling with an ever changing landscape of unknowns 
and risks to successful project delivery.   
There is a growing body of literature on the management of project uncertainty (cf. 
Martinsuo, Korhonen, & Laine, 2014; O’Connor & Rice, 2013; Perminova, Gustafsson, & 
Wikström, 2008; Saunders, Gale, & Sherry, 2015).  However there are only two prior studies 
of uncertainty in the specific context of safety-critical projects: a historical review of the 
1940's Manhattan Project to develop the atomic bomb (Lenfle, 2011) and an exploratory 
study of project uncertainty in civil nuclear and aerospace sectors by Saunders et al.(2015).  
Given the importance of safety-critical industries to modern life, and recent calls in the 
project management literature to replicate rather than reinvent project management research 
(Reich et al., 2013), our contribution here is to validate Saunders et al., (2015) exploratory 
study on a larger and more purposefully selected data set. Based on semi-structured 
interviews with 30 project management practitioners on 9 large-scale safety-critical projects, 
ranging in value from £25Million to upwards of £10Billion, it addresses two key research 
questions: 
RQ1: What are the different approaches adopted by project management practitioners2 
when faced with project uncertainty in safety-critical projects?      
RQ2: Are there cross-sector differences in how uncertainty emerges, is analysed and 
acted on between civil nuclear and civil aerospace projects?     
The next section of the paper introduces the theoretical context of the study. Subsequent 
sections describe the study design, its findings and their implications for how projects can 
better deal with uncertainty.      
2. Theoretical context 
Uncertainty is an interdisciplinary field, distributed across a range of disciplines from 
mathematics to economics, psychology and philosophy.  Taxonomies of uncertainty have 
been formulated (Kerwin, 1993; Smithson, 1989) and scholars have compared and contrasted 
different scholarly perspectives on uncertainty in pursuit of a richer understanding of it, how 
it arises and how it may be effectively controlled (Osman, 2010; Perminova et al., 2008; 
Smithson & Bammer, 2009).   
Grote states that “uncertainty is understood in its most basic form as not knowing for sure 
due to lack of information or ambiguous information” (Grote, 2015,p.272).  Uncertainty will 
always be present in projects (Atkinson, Crawford, & Ward, 2006; Winch & Maytorena, 
2011). However, what exercises scholars is how project managers understand it, how they 
represent it (either quantitatively or qualitatively) and whether it can be eliminated, must be 
tolerated or can actively be harnessed to the project’s advantage (Smithson & Bammer, 
2009).    
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Addressing these questions, researchers have provided definitions of project uncertainty (cf., 
(Hillson, 2002; Perminova et al., 2008; Ward & Chapman, 2003), identified the different 
sources of uncertainty (Atkinson et al., 2006; Martinsuo et al., 2014; Saunders, Gale, & 
Sherry, 2016; Ward & Chapman, 2003) and discussed a  variety of approaches to tame it 
(Browning, 2014; Chapman & Ward, 2011; Pich, Loch, & De Meyer, 2002).   
 Ward & Chapman (2003) argue that the project risk management process should be extended 
to incorporate uncertainty. They have also developed a first pass approach to improving 
estimation in projects (Chapman & Ward, 2000), a framework for managing stakeholder 
uncertainty (Ward & Chapman, 2008) and the PUMP process for managing project 
uncertainty throughout the project lifecycle (Chapman & Ward, 2011).  Atkinson et al. (2006) 
support this approach, arguing that uncertainty needs to be addressed at each stage of the 
project with particular emphasis on the setting of objectives, clarifying the priorities of 
different performance objectives and making the ownership of uncertainty explicit.   
More widespread and profound changes to the methods of the project manager in managing 
uncertainty are discussed by (Pich et al., 2002; Vidal, 2015; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).  
Cleden (2009) advocates identifying early warning signs of uncertainty through a 
combination of forecasting, scenario planning, anticipation strategies and fast-learning loops.  
He argues that uncertainty can be tamed provided project managers remain mindful at all 
times of the presence of uncertainty – a view echoed by Weick and Sutcliffe (2007).  Pich et 
al., (2002) propose ‘learning’ and ‘selectionism’ as two alternative approaches to managing 
highly uncertain projects. Learning implies a continual monitoring of the project environment 
in search of unknown-unknowns accompanied by rapid problem solving and changes in 
direction to the project as new information emerges.  Selectionism involves carrying out 
multiple parallel explorations and experiments into specific areas of uncertainty on the 
project and making a final decision on which is best during or after the process.  More 
recently, Vidal ( 2015) elucidated three different stances –that of the engineer, the craftsman 
and the gardener- that project managers might adopt when confronted with messy, uncertain 
and ambiguous situations.  The choice of stance adopted is contingent on the nature of the 
uncertainty being faced, the context in which the project is being undertaken and the world 
view of the individual confronting the uncertainty. So, in the stance of the engineer, 
uncertainty is caused by a lack of information and consequently acquiring more information 
or data, performing more calculations or testing can resolve the uncertainty. In contrast, the 
craftsman stance views uncertainty as ambiguity (where information can have multiple 
plausible interpretations) best managed using sense-making processes that seek to reduce this 
ambiguity.   The third stance is that of the gardener. Here the world is too complex to 
understand and fully control so the only solution is to act consistently on the small issues 
which in turn should mitigate any larger uncertainties. 
Other recent work on approaches to managing uncertainty (Martinsuo et al., 2014) identified 
three means of managing project uncertainty at the portfolio level; via rational, structural and 
power/culture based methods.  Examples of rational approaches include planning, 
controlling, budgeting and measuring performance on projects.  Structural approaches 
incorporate the governance of projects and the use of effective policies and power/cultural 
aspects address project values such as embracing failure and rewarding perseverance.  
Moving closer to the focus of this paper, Saunders et al. (2015) posited four approaches to 
uncertainty that are adopted by project managers in safety-critical contexts – structural, 
behavioural, relational and orientating.  The structural approach encompasses project 
processes and routines whilst the behavioural approach is centred on attitudes such as 
flexibility, optimism and being constantly mindful of the presence of uncertainty.  The 
relational approach stresses the collective nature of responding to uncertainty and the 
importance of communicating with key stakeholders including sponsors, clients and industry 
regulators. The fourth and final approach – an orientating one – concerns the use of 
navigational metaphors and aids to help project managers conceptualise and confront 
uncertainty.  However, this earlier study was based on a small set (n=8) of interviews.  
Addressing this limitation, our aim in this present study is to explore how 30 individuals 
involved in 9 large-scale safety-critical projects in civil aerospace and nuclear sectors, 
identify, analyse and act in the presence of uncertainty. 
3. Methods 
Our research design is a qualitative one, based on semi-structured interviews with 30 project 
management practitioners involved in 9 safety-critical projects in the UK.  Civil nuclear and 
aerospace sectors were chosen ahead of other safety-critical sectors such as oil and gas, as 
these two sectors although both highly regulated and manifestly safety-critical in nature, are 
subject to different commercial and regulatory pressures. Additionally, the timescales at 
which projects proceed are often considerably shorter in civil aerospace than in civil nuclear. 
The 9 UK based projects were purposefully selected to include projects from both sectors, 
drawn from six different organisations and to reflect two types of project –“new build/new 
product introduction projects” and “maintenance projects”.  Due to the commercially 
sensitive nature of the two sectors, extensive and time consuming negotiations were required 
to gain access to all of the projects.  As a consequence, project selection was based on the 
authors’ extensive industrial contacts. Despite this, collectively the nine projects do form a 
representative and balanced portfolio of projects across both sectors.  The projects are coded 
CN1 to CN5 for the civil nuclear and CA1 to CA4 for the civil aerospace projects.   Table 1 
provides a description of each project: its type, lifecycle stage, approximate budget and 
respondent roles.  Further details of the projects cannot be provided due to confidentiality 
restrictions.  Respondents were chosen by intensity sampling; a form of purposeful sampling 
where individuals are selected who are experts about a particular experience (Morse, 1994).  
On each project, respondents encompassed a variety of project roles (from technical to 
commercial) and operated at differing levels of seniority.  
Project Title Code Project Description Industry 
Sector 
Project 
Type 
Respondent Roles 
Intermediate 
level waste 
(ILW) storage 
facility 
CN1 Complete and commission 
a new storage facility 
capable of storing ILW 
nuclear material for 100yrs 
Budget £100’s Million. 
Lifecycle stage: Design 
Civil 
Nuclear 
maintenance Project Engineering 
Manager 
Project Director 
Project Controller 
Commercial Manager 
Reactor life-
extension 
project 
CN2 Develop safety cases to 
extend the life of existing 
nuclear reactors.   
Budget: £10’s Million/yr 
Lifecycle stage: Delivery 
Civil 
Nuclear 
maintenance Group Head of Project 
Technical Lead 
Sub-project Manager 
Sub-project Manager 
Development of 
new civil 
nuclear test 
facilities 
CN3 Commission and make 
operational two new 
nuclear test facilities for 
nuclear materials from 
both ends of fuel cycle.   
Budget £10’s Million 
Lifecycle stage: 
Commissioning 
Civil 
Nuclear 
new 
build/new 
product 
introduction 
Senior Project 
Manager 
Project Manager 
Risk Analyst 
Nuclear new 
build project 
CN4 Construction of new 
nuclear power plant 
Budget: £Billions 
Lifecycle stage: Feasibility 
Civil 
Nuclear 
new 
build/new 
product 
introduction 
Programme Manager 
Programme Manager 
Programme Manager 
Programme Manager 
Decommissioni
ng of specific 
elements of 
nuclear power 
station 
CN5 Safe removal and clean-up 
of material from former 
nuclear power station 
Budget: £10’s Million 
Lifecycle stage: Delivery 
Civil 
Nuclear 
maintenance Project Manager 
Commercial Manager 
Client account 
director 
Development of 
new gas turbine 
engine 
CA1 Design and delivery of 
new gas turbine engine for 
wide bodied airliner.   
Budget: £100’s Million 
Lifecycle stage: Design 
Civil 
Aerospace 
new 
build/new 
product 
introduction 
 
Subsystem 
Programme Manager 
Subsystem 
Programme Manager 
Deputy Programme 
Executive 
Retrofit of 
safety-critical 
assemblies to 
in-service 
aircraft 
CA2 Design and retrofit of 
safety critical assemblies 
to in-service civil airliner.   
Budget: £10’s Million 
Lifecycle stage: Delivery 
Civil 
Aerospace 
maintenance In service Programme 
manager 
Operations Shift 
Manager 
Project Team Leader 
Phased 
upgrades to in-
service aircraft 
CA3 Implement a number of 
change packages on two 
variants of in-service large 
civil airliner. 
Budget: £100’s Million 
Lifecycle stage: Delivery 
Civil 
Aerospace 
maintenance Deputy Programme 
Executive 
Chief of Subsystem 
Integrated Project 
team Leader 
Integrated Project 
team Leader 
Development of 
new test facility 
CA4 Design, construction and 
commissioning of aircraft 
assembly test bed.   
Budget:£10’s Million 
Stage:  Commissioning 
Civil 
Aerospace 
new 
build/new 
product 
introduction 
Programme Executive 
Project Manager   
Table 1: Description of the nine case study projects, together with respondent roles 
The interviews were undertaken at the project sites between March and Sept 2014.  Each 
interview lasted approximately 1 hour.  Two to four respondents per project were interviewed 
to minimise individual respondent bias.  During the second part of the interview respondents 
were asked to describe specific instances of uncertainty that had arisen during the course of 
their project (In part one of the interviews respondents had provided background information 
on the project, and discussed the sources of uncertainty in the project, as reported in Saunders 
et al., 2016).  The interview prompts (Figure 1) were based on Daft & Weick's (1984) theory 
of the organisation as an interpretive system and included questions about how the instances 
of uncertainty had emerged, how they were analysed and acted upon and what the impact on 
the project was.  
 
Figure 1: A copy of the interview prompts 
Asking respondents to provide detailed accounts of specific uncertainties enabled the 
building of a closer rapport with the respondents, which in turn generated richer accounts of 
these complex and uncertain situations.  In total, 47 vignettes of project uncertainty were 
recounted, with two typical vignettes shown in Table 2.  
 
Vignette of 
Project 
Uncertainty 
How uncertainty 
emerged 
How it was analysed How it was acted on Impact on project 
Migration of 
project 
scope from 
in-house 
design to 
externally 
designed 
single stage 
contract 
(CN1) 
The original project 
scope included a large 
in-house design 
activity.   
This design work was 
well underway, when 
suddenly the project 
team were told by the 
project sponsor to stop 
work and start the 
project again at the 
concept stage with a 
revised scope and 
different delivery 
mechanism.  
Engineering Project 
Manager described it 
as “like the fog 
coming down” with 
no clear way forward 
apparent.  
Once emotional 
denial of change was 
overcome, a 
structured process 
was employed, using 
requirements capture, 
value engineering and 
optioneering.   
A new concept for 
the project was 
worked out which 
was less costly, lower 
impact and more 
optimised. Then a 
new project was 
launched. 
Delayed 
programme by a 
number of months.  
Uncertainty 
over choice 
of 
technology 
to use for a 
nuclear 
material 
transfer 
flask (CN3) 
Senior Project Manager 
had an intuitive sense, 
based on past project 
experience that the 
current flask design 
might not be fit for 
purpose. 
He initiated in-house 
calculations to verify 
transfer flask 
capability. 
Results were 
analysed by the 
Senior Project 
Manager and 
engineers. Results 
confirmed that 
transfer flask is not 
currently fit for 
purpose. 
Information passed 
up to the Board to 
make a decision on 
whether the flask 
must be redesigned 
with additional 
lining.  
The flask is not 
required until 2017, 
so there is time to 
make this decision. 
No immediate 
impact on the 
project. 
 
There may be a 
redesign 
requirement which 
would lead to 
additional project 
costs. 
Table 2: Two example vignettes recounted on CN1 and CN3 
These vignettes were transcribed, anonymised and uploaded into QSR NVivo 10.  The 
vignettes were then analysed using template analysis; an iterative technique which involves 
the use of a coding template which is generated either a priori or from a preliminary analysis 
of a subset of the data (King, 2004).  The analysis process comprised three steps: 
1) Preliminary data coding of a random subset of the vignettes was undertaken using the 
4 conceptual approaches (structural, behavioural, relational and orientating) from 
Saunders et al. (2015) as the a priori high-level themes.  
2) New second order themes that emerged from the subset of vignettes, such as whether 
uncertainty emerged during an incident or through the outworking of a project 
process, and the tensions between, for example, a data and judgement driven analysis 
of uncertainty and a proactive versus reactive response to uncertainty were then 
organised into clusters.  This enabled an initial coding template to be drawn up, 
incorporating both the approaches to managing uncertainty and a number of tensions 
or dualities that were observed in how uncertainty emerged, was analysed and acted 
upon.  
3) This coding template was applied to the remaining vignettes, and was modified and 
refined as new clusters emerged in an iterative process. For example, during this 
process the relational and orientating approaches were combined, thereby reducing 
the conceptual approaches from four to three. This process culminated in the final 
coding template (captured in Figure 2 below), comprising three approaches and nine 
dualities.  All 47 vignettes were then coded against this final template, generating a 
more comprehensive model for how project uncertainty is managed by practitioners 
and the tensions that accompany them.   
 
Figure 2: Final NVivo 10 coding template  
4. Findings 
In total, 47 instances of project uncertainty were described in the 30 interviews; 23 from civil 
aerospace projects and 24 from civil nuclear projects.  In the civil aerospace projects these 
incidents ranged from uncertainties in the choice of technical solution for an engine wiring 
harness, to unexpected failures on the engine test bed, to inabilities to communicate changed 
customer requirements to the project team.  In the civil nuclear projects, uncertainties 
included difficulties in gaining clarity over the project scope, uncertainties in information on 
reactor designs, and a lack of understanding of the interconnectedness of key elements of 
operating nuclear power stations.     
4.1 Conceptual approaches to project uncertainty 
Perhaps to be expected in the highly technical, highly consequential environment of large-
scale civil nuclear and civil aerospace projects, there was widespread adoption of structural 
approaches to the management of project uncertainty. Respondents in both sectors invoked 
key project processes, such as the project change board and gated reviews as triggers by 
which uncertainties emerged, were analysed and decisions made.  Project uncertainty was 
quantified wherever possible, particularly in civil nuclear projects, using organisational 
norms, probabilistic scheduling (using P50 and P80 values) and Monte Carlo simulations, 
even though there was a tacit acknowledgement that the assumptions and figures 
underpinning these probabilistic techniques included elements of uncertainty in themselves.  
Contingency funds played an important role here in resolving this conundrum.  Also captured 
was the structural importance of the test programme in the lifecycle of civil aerospace 
projects. In the test environment new components are introduced, theoretical analyses are 
scrutinised, minor adjustments made to optimise performance and engines (occasionally 
intentionally and expensively) damaged in pursuit of maximum learning about the system. 
Here the entire project team responds to the drum beat of the test programme, which is 
paradoxically both reducing uncertainties as system maturity increases and simultaneously 
throwing up new ones in the form of unexpected test results or unanticipated component 
failures.  In the civil nuclear sector the requirement to produce numerous safety-cases, 
allowing the current project status to be ‘banked’ at regular intervals provided a similar, if 
slower, rhythm for the projects. 
In both civil aerospace and nuclear projects the dominant approach to project uncertainty was 
a behavioural one.  Wrestling with uncertainty required flexibility, tenacity, resilience, 
decision-making skills and positivity, tempered with an appropriate level of caution.  In the 
words of a Deputy Programme Executive (CA3), project managers should “never 
underestimate the ability of the engine to tell us something which we didn’t expect.”   Many 
of these skills had been honed on previous projects and several respondents admitted that 
they were motivated by a fear of failure, which drove them to find, confront and resolve 
uncertainty.  Managing uncertainty was also a collective, rather than individual endeavour 
with respondents acknowledging that no one person could resolve complex and unfolding 
uncertainties. Instead project managers drew repeatedly on teams of highly skilled and 
technically diverse specialists to minimise the risk of inadequately characterising an 
emerging uncertainty.  There was also a requirement for high levels of trust and co-operation 
within these multi-functional, multi-organisational project teams, with consensual and 
collaborative problem solving required, even when this put the project team at odds with the 
host organisational culture; a challenge often exacerbated by sub-optimal contractual and 
incentive structures.   This finding supports Saunders et al. (2015) argument that the 
capability of the project team and the wider project organisation are important determinants 
of uncertainty in the safety-critical context. 
The third approach to managing uncertainty is a relational one.  A collective response to 
uncertainties was observed using workshops and problem solving teams which typically 
involved external experts.  These ‘independents’ were often technical experts whose skills 
and objectivity were required to reduce technical uncertainties.   The engagement of the 
project supply chain was actively sought by respondents in this study, even if, as on the new 
nuclear build project (CN4) and the new aerospace test facility (CA4), key suppliers were 
reluctant to expose their detailed time-plans to scrutiny.  In urgent situations, emerging 
uncertainties were quickly escalated to project director level where decisions could be made.  
In particular, the civil aerospace projects often thrived on the energy of firefighting emerging 
uncertainties, instead of proactively identifying uncertainties and putting in place sufficient 
resources to address them, before crisis point was reached and project delivery dates were at 
risk.   
Stakeholder management was also central to the management of project uncertainty.  In the 
civil aerospace sector, project sponsors were more sympathetic to the presence of uncertainty 
in projects, if they were made aware of it (i.e. there were no surprises).  However 
communicating uncertainty to end customers (aircraft manufacturers or airline operators) was 
an often underestimated part of the management of uncertainty.  In the civil nuclear sector 
respondents experienced greater challenges in gaining buy-in to realistically defined levels of 
uncertainty in the higher echelons of host organisations; evidence of this was observed at 
both ends of the nuclear lifecycle from new nuclear build (CN4) to the Intermediate Level 
Waste (ILW) storage facility (CN1).   The relationship with external stakeholders such as the 
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority and the Office of Nuclear Regulation also had to be 
carefully managed. Failure to provide them with information in a timely manner could lead to 
a loss of confidence in the project, with potentially huge consequences for its future sanction 
and (or) licencing.   
Within civil aerospace projects, there was only limited evidence of an orientating approach 
to the management of uncertainty.  Respondents described “shuffling the chairs”, “travelling 
in hope” and “fumbling around in the dark” but more as turns of phrase, rather than as a 
distinct approach to dealing with project uncertainty.  In civil nuclear projects respondents 
also used a succession of travel metaphors but these metaphors also revealed important 
insights into the way in which the project uncertainties were managed, for example:  
“Projects start down multiple explorations – lots of pathways for the project and then at 
periodic intervals the emerging information and analysis is banked through the mechanism of 
a written safety case. Actually the safety cases are the project” Group Head of Projects 
(CN2).  
Within civil nuclear projects the orientating approach should not be discounted.  However, 
given that there were only 9 references to this in civil nuclear project interviews in contrast to 
upwards of 30 instances of structural and relational and over 50 instances of behavioural 
approaches, it has been subsumed into the relational approach.  The four conceptual 
approaches posited in Saunders et al., (2015) have therefore been rationalised into three – 
structural, behavioural and relational – with the relational approach expanded to 
incorporate not just people but also position, to take account of the orientating approach.   
4.2 Dualities and dilemmas in contending with project uncertainty 
Within the three approaches, nine dualities were identified based on observed tensions in how 
uncertainty emerged, was analysed and acted on by the respondents. Three of these nine 
dualities related to how uncertainty emerges, three to how uncertainty is analysed and three to 
how uncertainty is acted upon.  The nine dualities are grouped around each of the three 
conceptual approaches to managing project uncertainty –structural, behavioural and relational 
generating a more comprehensive model (Figure 3) of how uncertainty unfolds and is 
responded to within these safety-critical projects.  For example, in ‘how uncertainty emerges’ 
there is a structural duality in whether uncertainty emerges through an incident or through a 
process, a behavioural duality in whether it emerges by chance or through planning, and a 
relational duality around whether project leaders are observers or actors.    
 
Figure 3: Dualities in how uncertainty emerges, is analysed and responded to in the three 
approaches to project uncertainty  
Table 3 provides a brief definition of each of these nine dualities, showing that the dualities 
are, in most cases, not binary constructs, but are characterised by a spectrum of practices and 
behaviours.  
Duality Brief Definition 
Emerges via incident vs 
Emerges via process 
Does the project uncertainty emerge via an incident on the project (for example, the finding of 
unexpected asbestos in a nuclear decommissioning project) or does it emerge as a result of 
carrying out the regular and routine project processes? 
Analysis is data vs 
judgement led 
Is hard data or professional judgement privileged in the analysis of the project uncertainty? 
Response is local vs 
system wide  
Is the eventual solution to the uncertainty one which is local, pragmatic, incremental or in 
some sense suboptimal or is it one that is system (programme or organisation) wide and 
longer term? 
Emerges through chance 
vs planning 
Does the project uncertainty emerge through chance and good fortune or through good 
planning and the preparedness of the project team? 
Analysis denies 
uncertainty vs accepts 
uncertainty 
Is the presence of the uncertainty denied (for example, assuming that a technical fault is a one 
off rather than a precursor to a series of component failures) or does a mind-set of 
acknowledging uncertainty prevail? 
Response is reactive vs 
proactive 
Is the response to project uncertainty reactive in nature, or is the uncertainty proactively 
monitored so that contingency plans are ready to put in place should the need arise? 
Project leaders are actors 
vs observers 
Is the primary role of senior management that of an impartial observer, evaluating project 
decisions, or is their role that of an involved actor on the project whose actions and decisions 
Behavioural 
Approach
• Attitude
• Flexibility
• Decision 
making
Relational 
Approach
• Communicat-
ions
• Stakeholders
• Positions
Emerges through an incident
Responses are local
Analysis is data led
Emerges through processes
Responses are system-wide 
Analysis is judgement led
Response is reactive
Analysis denies uncertainty
Emerges by chance
Response is proactive
Analysis accepts uncertainty
Emerges through planning 
Analysis is individual
Project leaders are observers
Analysis is collective 
Project leaders are actors
Response privileges direction of travel Response privileges absolute location
Structural 
Approach
• Routines 
• Processes
• Platforms
may shape the emergence of uncertainty? 
Analysis is individual vs 
collective  
Is the process of investigating and analysing uncertainty an individual endeavour or is it more 
collective and collaborative in nature? 
Response privileges the 
direction of travel vs 
absolute location 
Do project management practitioners privilege responses to uncertainty that enable them to 
move forward in the right direction, rather than those that value absolute location and exact 
status of the project at a particular point in time? 
Table 3: Brief description of each of the nine dualities 
4.2.1 Structural dualities in how project uncertainty emerged, was analysed and acted upon 
Table 4 provides illustrative quotes of the three structural dualities – uncertainty emerges via 
incident vs process, its analysis is data led vs judgement led and the response is local vs 
system wide. 
Structural 
Dualities 
Illustrative Quotations Civil Aerospace Illustrative Quotations Civil Nuclear 
Emerges via an 
incident 
“But almost immediately the product went into 
service [component x] began to fail, and we 
were all rather bemused as to why that was the 
case. “Deputy Programme Executive, CA3 
“Asbestos was discovered when drilling through 
the structure.  Staff immediately downed tools 
and stopped work.” Account Director, CN5 
 
Emerges via a 
process 
“Each design gate asks a number of questions - 
tick box – so the team could eventually no 
longer prove the novel [subsystem] – they could 
not show the figures – suddenly became very 
uncertain and a very top issue. “Subsystem 
Programme Manager, CA1 
“Having been asked to get a single stage 
contract for this project, we didn’t have norms 
that we could use.  Lack of norms became an 
uncertainty to us. So instead of running the risk 
model as we normally do ….. we ran the risk 
model with a much higher level of estimating 
uncertainty than usual.” Project Director, CN1 
Analysis is data 
led 
“I try and be more structured and data driven in 
terms of making decisions.” Deputy Programme 
Executive, CA3 
 
“one of the things we have tried to do 
differently is to build a single integrated cost 
schedule risk programme, and we built it 
originally on a base schedule which says that if 
everything goes well, we can do it in these 
durations at this cost and the network is 
appropriate– challenging but sufficient.  That 
gives us a deterministic completion date and 
also commensurate cost. We then apply our 
uncertainty.  In addition to the uncertainty we 
then have the risks that are appropriate for our 
scope.  So we apply the uncertainty to the base 
estimate, we then allocated the risks to the 
individual activities (with impact and probability) 
and then do bit of Monte Carlo to come up with 
impact of those risks on completion date and 
cost. This is a standard process. “ Project 
Controller, CN1 
Analysis is 
judgement led 
“I went to talk to [x] who is a design person of 
long experience and seniority, and had an 
independent informal chat with him about it.  
After that I concluded that we would have to re-
plan the project. “Team Leader project, CA3 
“We got new data and there was higher weight 
loss than expected.  In-fact it suggested that we 
could have exceeded the weight loss limit.  We 
had to put an emergency safety case in place 
and it was on a judgement because in reality we 
did not believe the data. “ Group Head of 
Projects, CN2 
Response is local 
one 
“I put a proposal on the table at this meeting, 
asking ‘what is the minimum that we need to 
test?’  And we decided that we could get the 
parts made quickly for development use only 
and test and this was the workaround. We also 
“So I treated this [redesign] as a singular 
objective, and I didn’t have the confidence that 
[company N] had the ability to design a solution, 
given their track record. So I formed a task force 
within my team to redesign the concept 
had to discuss how we could get the test done 
and on which engines as some of the engines 
are already on test. So again I asked ‘what is the 
minimum we could live with in terms of 
numbers of engines to test?’  This is how we put 
the plans together. ” 
Cost Team leader, CA3 
mechanical and electrical which was done within 
two weeks.  It was redesigned, approved, 
procured, ordered and built and approved to 
operate in two months.  So it took [Company N] 
two years to make it and we redesigned it and 
made it in two months.  ” Project Manager, CN5 
Response is 
system wide 
“Long-term this isn’t feasible [to rig up the 
instrumentation at the new test facility]. It adds 
a lot of time and ties up expertise and 
knowledge and cost. And you lose your 
flexibility. ….. And this was all part of the 
business case, to say are we going to spend £x 
on the trailer and how many times would you 
have to ship an engine backwards and forwards 
to make it worthwhile.  Four or five engines per 
year and it soon starts to pay back quite 
quickly.” Programme Executive, CA4 
 
“Should we carry on with what we’ve got and 
acknowledge that there would be a big 
commercial bun-fight at the end of it? And being 
the first contract is this giving us the behaviours 
that we want to see on the project? Should we 
terminate the contract -with potential big cost 
implications? Should we amend the contract? 
We did a series of pros and cons type analysis, 
with the project director and key stakeholders, 
construction director and the engineering 
director. We talked about removing elements of 
scope. But what we ended up with was to 
convert the contract from FIDIC to NEC target 
cost to try and get alignment with the other 
contracts.” Programme Manager, CN4 
Table 4: Illustrative quotations of the three structural dualities 
The launching of a competitor product, in-service faults such as gearbox leaks, or broken 
sensors, and customer requests for change were all examples of uncertainty in civil aerospace 
projects that arose from a critical incident on a project. Unsurprisingly these incident driven 
uncertainties were more prevalent on maintenance projects, where the equipment is already in 
service but not yet optimised for routine aircraft operations.  In contrast, on new product 
introduction/new test facility projects the uncertainty was more likely to emerge as a 
consequence of the execution of a specific project process, such as the gated review process 
or most commonly during the engine or aircraft test programme.   
What is striking about the civil nuclear projects is that the great majority of the uncertainties 
described emerged via the outworking of specific project processes – for example the 
scheduling process on CN4 exposing uncertainties in the area of building inter-containment, 
or the building of the project risk model in the ILW storage facility project (CN1) which 
revealed an absence of organisational norms for the type of contract being adopted. There 
were examples of uncertainty in civil nuclear projects that emerged via an incident but these 
were much fewer in number (for example, higher than expected weight loss in the core of in-
service nuclear reactors on CN2, and asbestos found in the building structure being 
decommissioned on CN5). 
Possible explanations for this discrepancy between the two sectors could be the more tightly 
process bound environment of the nuclear industry compared with the more flexible approach 
in the aerospace sector.  Nuclear industry project managers must always be seen to be 
following mandated processes and to be ‘doing the right thing’, whereas there seems to be 
more leeway for individual judgement and learning by trial and error in the civil aerospace 
project environment, with the engine/aircraft test programme providing a final safety check 
on all new technology and product development work-streams.  
There was considerably less divergence between civil nuclear and aerospace projects in terms 
of the second duality – that of whether data or judgement driven processes were privileged in 
the analysis of a particular project uncertainty.  In both sectors there was a preference for the 
use of data to underpin analyses of uncertainty and the use of logical processes to reach a 
decision on both its root cause and how to respond to it.  Nevertheless, Table 4 demonstrates 
that data and judgement are not binary constructs, and several respondents described 
instances of uncertainty in which both data and judgement were applied in tandem in an 
attempt to address complex problems which often had several plausible root causes. 
The privileging of data over judgement was in part influenced by the dominant engineering 
culture in the studied project teams, but was also a means of being able to justify the analysis 
to senior management and the customer/regulator alike.  When analysing incidents of project 
uncertainty, practitioners face a dilemma between the need to produce hard confirmatory data 
to sponsors, customers and regulators and the oft-experienced difficulty of obtaining such 
data and the subsequent reliance on professional judgement and experience.  
The third duality was that between arriving at a solution that was local versus one that was 
system wide.  In both sectors there were a range of responses.  At times an interim solution 
was adopted, enabling the project to maintain momentum whilst more robust longer term 
solutions were developed.  This often necessitated a constrained or sub-optimal solution, that 
could be tested before decisions could be made on what longer-term, more resource- 
intensive solution was required.  At other times, often after much wasted time and effort on 
finding a solution, a more comprehensive system-wide approach was taken.  Project 
managers were also observed to implement solutions that gave the greatest benefit to the 
wider organisation, but not necessarily to the local project team.  Such decisions were 
however only reached after much discussion and debate.  The dilemma facing project 
management practitioners on safety-critical projects lies in knowing whether an incremental 
or longer-term, a local or system wide solution is more appropriate in acting on a specific 
project uncertainty. This is at best a difficult judgement call, and at worst a matter of trial and 
error learning from time consuming, expensive and failed solutions. 
4.2.2 Behavioural dualities in how project uncertainty emerged, was analysed and acted 
upon 
Table 5 provides illustrative quotes of the three observed behavioural dualities – chance vs 
planning, denial vs acceptance and reactive vs proactive. 
Behavioural Dualities Illustrative Quotations Civil Aerospace Illustrative Quotations Civil Nuclear 
Emerges via chance “So next time I would make sure that we 
did this the same way. Last time I did it by 
luck but next time I will do it much more 
deliberately” Project Team Leader, CA2 
NONE 
Emerges via planning “We’ve had this issue before on other test 
facilities ……  It’s something we are aware 
of, so we check for it from day one.” 
Project Manager, CA4 
 
 
“So as part of the project we have to deliver a 
transfer capability between two buildings. We 
have procured currently a flask based on a 
specification. It wasn’t until last Friday when we 
did some advanced calculations on the 
capability of that flask, that the capability of 
that flask was brought into question.  ………. I 
initiated these calculations.” Senior Project 
Manager, CN3 
Analysis denies 
uncertainty 
“We spent the first few months in denial 
thinking that this was just a one-off and 
then it became a two off and it went on 
“One contractor said ‘we didn’t actually read 
the tender as we were too busy’.  But nobody 
here wanted to admit that there were problems 
and on.”  Deputy Programme Executive, 
CA3 
 
in capacity in the supply chain. So the approach 
is that we will just muddle through the project 
and project timescale will just start to slip to the 
right. ” Commercial Manager, CN1 
Analysis accepts 
uncertainty 
“One of the key characteristics of the role 
is the ability to deal with ambiguity and 
uncertainty.  The reality is that week in 
week out there will be uncertainty arising. 
My engineering background means I like to 
know everything that there is to know 
about something.  Over time I’ve got more 
comfortable with dealing with uncertainty.  
Sometimes it is gut feel and instinct; you 
just get a feel for the 3, 4 or 5 things I need 
to make sure are supported, coaxed along. 
The rest of the stuff will just happen.”  
Deputy Programme Executive, CA3 
“Based on a routine inspection – we got an 
outcome that didn’t agree with the model. We 
have got a problem – panic. So we wrote an 
emergency safety case based on a judgement 
and that bought us 6months. I tasked someone 
in the team with this job.  In that 6 months we 
set out 3 work streams to address the issue and 
basically one was to raise the limit a bit, second 
bit to look at data and reconfirm it was true, 
thirdly perform extrapolation to confirm – as 
everybody adds conservatisms. “Group Head of 
Projects, CN2 
Response is reactive “From a project management perspective 
your success indicators of costs, weight 
were brilliant.  Then in a moment this was 
turned on its head and you suddenly had 
to find this resource when we thought we 
were finished and the whole regulatory 
impact of not achieving it was huge.”  
Subsystem programme manager CA1 
“If it’s an uncertainty and we don’t know what’s 
going to happen we will just have to deal with it 
when the problem occurs.” Sub-project 
Manager, CN2 
 
 
 Response is proactive “At present it is a judgement call, but I 
cannot take my eye off it completely, so I 
keep giving it a knock every now and again, 
so that when it’s needed I can resurrect the 
priority.” Subsystem Programme Manager, 
CA1 
“So a lot of the schedule uncertainty goes away 
when you are building confidence.  The fact 
that there is uncertainty means that there are 
no absolutes at that point.  So you have to start 
with establishing some assumptions. So we 
started to build the schedule and put 
assumptions around it.  We validated these 
assumptions with other disciplines in terms of 
the interfaces.  We had a lot of data coming out 
of [Project B], but the integrity of that data 
wasn’t fully assured. We took the decision to 
take the data on face value, and put an 
assumption around it that it was based on 
[Project B] data.  We then validated it in the 
supply chain.  We gave it to one of the bidders 
and they worked with us to validate sections of 
the schedule so that we can extrapolate that to 
the rest of the schedule. It gave us a degree of 
underpinning.” Programme Manager, CN4  
Table 5: Illustrative quotations of the three behavioural dualities 
There was more open acknowledgment from civil aerospace respondents that uncertainty 
often emerged in an unplanned and fortuitous manner. For example, on CA2, designers had 
prepared additional drawings of a key part, with a nominal hole that could be increased in 
size as required.  So when an uncertainty in testing emerged and the holes were found to be 
too large, the project team could revert to the additional design drawings and only two days’ 
time was lost on the project.  Through good fortune, the supplier had not yet drilled the larger 
holes in the parts- otherwise the lost time would have been in the order of weeks not days.  In 
contrast, strenuous efforts were made in the civil nuclear projects to plan for uncertainty; and 
to use the planning, contract management and other processes to drive out latent uncertainties 
in these large-scale safety-critical projects.  On four of the five nuclear case study projects 
respondents described instances of uncertainty that had emerged in this way.  And strikingly, 
none of the civil nuclear respondents reported instances of uncertainty that emerged by 
chance or good fortune – evidence of a concrete difference between the two sectors.   
In civil aerospace projects there were several instances where uncertainty was denied, at least 
in the early stages of its emergence and analysis.  There were also civil aerospace accounts 
that stressed the pervasive nature of project uncertainty within projects and the need for 
project managers to acknowledge it – however these were less common.   More often it was 
assumed that a technical fault was a one off rather than a precursor to a series of component 
failures.  The pressure of the project schedule also hindered the prompt identification of 
project uncertainties, with respondents hoping that a problem could be resolved before it 
needed to be escalated.  These behaviours can slow reaction time on projects and cause issues 
to lie hidden, gradually growing in magnitude and consequence, until their presence can no 
longer be denied.  Then individuals switch rapidly into a responsive, fire-fighting mode with 
resources mobilised, key stakeholders informed and myriad urgent actions taken to finally 
address the uncertainty.  The difficulty with this approach is that it can be exciting and 
energising to work on an urgent problem, and more worryingly organisations often reward 
project managers who can heroically resolve problematic and pressing issues, without 
appreciating that it may be that same individual’s initial denial of the issue that has led to the 
requirement for such a dramatic response.  Such behaviour can be understood in terms of 
normalisation of deviance (Pinto, 2014) and can become an ingrained and culturally 
acceptable way of behaving.  
Within the civil nuclear projects there was typically more acceptance of uncertainty within 
the project environments from the outset.  There were only very few instances of uncertainty 
where the problem was denied or ignored by the project teams, with most respondents readily 
accepting project uncertainty and putting their efforts into resolving it as soon as possible.  
For example, the Group Head of Projects on CN2, when confronted with an unexpected 
situation in an operating nuclear reactor core, did not prevaricate, even though he did not 
fully understand the cause of the uncertainty.  Instead, acknowledging the very high stakes 
involved, he immediately initiated a series of actions to characterise and quantify the 
uncertainty.   
The dilemma facing organisations involved in safety-critical projects is to find a way of 
encouraging and rewarding these uncertainty accepting behaviours whilst also trying to 
reduce incidents of uncertainty denial.  Modelling appropriate behaviour and rewarding the 
raising of uncertainty, as well as its heroic resolution might be steps in the right direction. 
Karl Weick (Coutu, 2003) recounts a powerful episode in military history when a Redstone 
missile lost control during testing. When one of the engineers admitted that he had caused the 
error, the lead scientist Werner von Braun sent him a bottle of champagne, rather than issuing 
a reprimand. Such stories stay long in the consciousness of organisations and their members. 
The final behavioural duality concerns whether the response to uncertainty is reactive or 
proactive. In civil nuclear projects there was more extensive evidence of uncertainty being 
managed proactively, whether the nature of the response was to collect quantitative data or 
simply to ask questions.  In civil aerospace, dealing with an uncertainty could be very 
reactive in nature, as articulated by one of the Civil Aerospace Sub System Programme 
Managers on project CA1 in Table 5.  Here the project team quickly found themselves on the 
back foot, having to secure additional resources and even redesign whole elements of the 
project around one problematic subsystem.  However there were also occasions where civil 
aerospace respondents kept a close eye on latent uncertainties in the project, which could not 
be resolved immediately but had the potential to derail future progress on the project.  Here 
respondents were unable to resolve the uncertainty due to a lack of information; nor were 
they willing to ignore it and wait for it to result in a more complex and challenging situation.  
This tension between waiting and acting, between proactive and reactive behaviour is 
fundamental to the role of the project manager in dealing with uncertainty; yet is one where 
there is no single right answer, and it ultimately comes down to a complex judgement call 
underpinned by data, experience and intuition.  These differing responses to uncertainty could 
also flow from how the uncertainties emerge and are analysed.  An uncertainty that comes to 
light somewhat fortuitously, or whose presence is initially denied, is highly likely to lead to a 
response strategy that is reactive; one that is driven by events, rather than by anticipating 
them.  In civil aerospace projects ‘the die is often already cast’ by the time the uncertainty is 
addressed, leading to fire-fighting and urgent, expensive reallocation of resources.  In civil 
nuclear projects there is earlier acknowledgement and analysis of project uncertainties, 
engendering a more proactive organisational response.  
 
4.2.3 Relational dualities in how project uncertainty emerged, was analysed and acted upon 
Table 6 shows illustrative quotes of the three relational dualities – project leaders as 
observers vs actors, individual vs collective analysis and a response that privileges the 
direction of travel vs absolute location. 
 
 
 
 
 
Relational Dualities Illustrative Quotations Civil Aerospace Illustrative Quotations Civil Nuclear 
Project leader as 
observer 
“Two [assemblies] had to be taken out of 
the development programme.  The seniors 
knew all about it but weren’t very good at 
flowing that information downwards.  So, 
for the people involved in the supply chain, 
getting the parts in etc. it was all rumour 
and hearsay.  You ended up taking a lot of 
flak from people underneath for not telling 
people what was going on.” Subsystem 
Programme Manager, CA1 
“There is a risk that we may need to tunnel in 
from outside, seal the joint and then backfill with 
concrete – so what’s the probability of that and 
its impact on project. We are less good at paying 
attention to these risks, and it’s not done by 
people sufficiently high up the food chain.  We 
don’t have buy-in at high enough level.”  Project 
Controller, CN1 
Project leader as 
actor 
“I was talking to the [supplier] CEO - so 
very senior level. I was asking him, looking 
for his commitment, has he got enough 
resource, his confidence levels…..So I was 
gaining my own confidence through the 
supplier, and I was able to communicate 
that to my seniors.  We also did daily calls 
with the team on the ground, making sure 
we understood the exact status on the 
ground. ……. So I think it was about 
communication, about discussion, and 
about understanding.” Programme 
Executive, CA4 
“I know the technical people in the project – they 
are either glass half full or empty people.  If you 
responded to every little minor perturbation the 
business would be getting a different answer 
every five minutes. So I provide a damper to it all. 
I try to realise which are important ones. I try to 
manage expectations. Everyone knows it is 
uncertain and there are challenges so what I try 
to do is to see what the important ones are and 
decide – do we stick with the same course or do 
we shift slightly. Rarely do we stop completely 
and change.” Group Head of Projects, CN2 
 
Analysis is individual NONE NONE 
Analysis is collective “So there was quite a significant team of 
people who were investigating it, the 
whole system.”  Operations Manager, CA2 
 
 
“We do have to be careful to rank the 
consequences of uncertainty; we need to 
prioritise.  Prioritisation is done with the safety-
case officer but it’s not an authoritarian 
approach, not prescriptive – more about 
openness with partners. We work better when 
we are more open. Whenever a question is raised 
I try to make sure that whoever has asked the 
question is satisfied with the answer. Typically 
these meetings have a dozen or so people round 
the table; none of whom are shy, all of whom are 
smart and only too quick to leap in if share 
concerns.  We deal with it in an informal 
committee type way –consultative.” Technical 
Lead, CN2 
Response privileges 
the direction of 
travel 
“When we test these parts in the engine – 
we think that will lower the risk but it 
won’t – you’ll get an understanding as you 
go down that journey - but you are 
travelling in hope” Subsystem Programme 
Manager, CA1 
“While you’ve got uncertainty, what I’m always 
inclined to do is to show people all the little steps 
of success that we have achieved.  There is no 
doubt that being able to pull the curtains off and 
go wow is a mass uplifter, but sometimes this 
means that you are inclined to ignore all the little 
successes. ” Programme Manager, CN4 
 Response privileges 
absolute location 
“I am by nature a planner.  I like to see 
everything mapped out.  I like to have a 
plan for short-term weekly, medium-term 
monthly and a long-term plan.” Project 
team leader, CA2 
“[The documents] are not fit for purpose. We had 
assumed those documents didn’t need rework, so 
didn’t build it into the program. Therefore we 
then had a long discussion with [the client] about 
who was right and who is wrong but we 
ultimately had to go back and redo this work.  
What we’ve learnt is, that, you know, all of our 
documentation has gone through a thorough 
rigorous check to make sure that we are up to 
date with modern standards, we are not going to 
trip ourselves up again” Project Manager, CN3 
Table 6: Illustrative quotations of the three relational dualities 
The role of senior management in identifying and acting on project uncertainty is the source 
of the next duality. Is the primary role of senior management that of an impartial observer, 
merely confirming project decisions, or are they an involved actor - a project insider - whose 
actions and decisions may shape the emergence of uncertainty?  (Reiman et al., 2015) Or do 
they switch between these roles as the need arises?  In the overwhelming majority of 
incidents described in this study senior managers (project sponsors, project directors etc.) 
were active participants as uncertainties emerged.  On only one occasion did the senior 
management team remain detached from an issue; failing to communicate important changes 
to the project schedule to the Programme Managers. In most other incidences of uncertainty 
senior managers were at the heart of the action to recover the situation.  Project directors 
generally saw themselves as very hands on, unafraid to make priority calls, set demanding 
objectives and defend the project team.  The active role played by senior management in 
these high-consequence, complex safety-critical projects supports the accepted wisdom in the 
practice of project management that governance structures, effective communication and the 
modelling of “right” behaviours from the top down remain a key ingredient for effective 
project delivery (Pinto, 2014). 
The notion of project actors influencing the emergence and analysis of project uncertainty 
continues with the next duality; between the individual and collective analysis of uncertainty.  
Within these safety-critical projects, the process of investigating and analysing uncertainty 
was always a collective and generally a collaborative one.  Lone individual analyses were not 
observed in either sector. Instead the quotations in Table 6 demonstrate that the analysis of 
uncertainty was multi-disciplinary in nature, and reached beyond the host project organisation 
outwards into the supply chain, even when the supplier may also be a competitor.  One 
explanation for this is that the sheer complexity of the technology coupled with its safety-
critical nature overrides otherwise reasonable commercial sensitivities about proprietary 
information and processes in pursuit of a robust analysis of uncertainty.  Additionally, in the 
nuclear projects, independent technical experts from outside the project team were regularly 
drafted in to peer review the analysis of uncertainty providing an additional level of scrutiny 
of uncertainties that could be highly-consequential in nature.  This need to continually consult 
independent experts is driven in part by the safety-imperative that pervades the nuclear 
industry, but is exacerbated by the fractured and piecemeal manner in which nuclear assets 
have been constructed and maintained over the last 50 years in the UK. Instead of a fleet of 
similar reactors, all following a standard design the UK has three very distinct technologies 
developed in three successive waves of civil nuclear power expansion, and even within the 
same power station the design of the two reactors can vary considerably (Wearne, 2015).  
Technical uncertainties around the through-life maintenance and decommissioning of these 
nuclear assets are often context specific, necessitating the engagement of the few individuals 
who are familiar with that particular technology.   
The final relational duality concerns the position of the project, in relation to its finished 
status.  Here the dilemma facing project managers is whether to prioritise responses to 
uncertainty that enable them to proceed in the right direction, rather than those that value 
knowing the exact status of the project at a particular time.  In both sectors a similar spread of 
responses to uncertainty was observed, from those which intentionally focused on a step by 
step process of reducing uncertainty, to those which set their sights on building a complete 
picture of the landscape of uncertainty with which they were confronted.  These responses 
were independent of project type; instead they were context specific, influenced in no small 
measure by the amount of resources at hand to resolve the uncertainty faced by the team. 
Coutu (2003) argues that acting on and interpreting what is happening, even in the absence of 
a complete picture of events, helps individuals move towards a solution.  Perhaps pragmatism 
was also at work here, given that the exact status of the project can change very quickly as a 
result of emerging uncertainties. It is also possible that individuals with varied psychological 
profiles interpret and respond to uncertainty differently as argued by (Madsen & Pries-Heje, 
2009).  
5. Discussion 
This study has drawn attention to how project uncertainty emerges, is made sense of and 
responded to in the context of large-scale safety-critical projects.  Our first contribution is to 
extend earlier work (by Chapman & Ward, 2011; Martinsuo et al., 2014; Olsson, 2006; Pich 
et al., 2002; Vidal, 2015) to proffer three approaches that project managers adopt when 
confronting project uncertainty – structural, behavioural and relational.  These three 
approaches are complementary rather than competing; with a combination of all three 
required to deal with emerging uncertainties before they negatively impact on project 
delivery.  In both civil aerospace and nuclear projects the behavioural approach was dominant 
with individual personalities, attitudes, skill-sets and actions central to confronting 
uncertainty.  However these behaviours were augmented by effective relationships with 
stakeholders, sponsors and project team members, and underpinned with sound project 
processes and structures (as argued by Martinsuo et al., 2014).  Being seen to be following 
the correct processes enabled respondents to demonstrate ‘control’ of some very complex and 
ambiguous project situations - important both for their psychological well-being, and in 
building stakeholder confidence in the project.  Importantly, we have also demonstrated that 
contending with project uncertainty involves much more than implementing a new project 
process, or broadening the scope of the risk management process to incorporate uncertainty 
(Hillson, 2002; Ward & Chapman, 2003).  Rather, managing uncertainty is a mind-set 
(Cleden, 2009; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007): about accepting uncertainty as an unavoidable fact 
of projects (Chapman & Ward, 2011), about rigorous use of all available project processes to 
drive out uncertainties as early as possible and about leveraging relationships with project 
stakeholders, sponsors and team members to maintain focus on the project outcomes even in 
messy and ambiguous situations (Atkinson et al., 2006).   These findings may also have wider 
implications for safety management practices within these two industry sectors.  For example, 
adopting the three approaches to managing project uncertainty – structural, behavioural and 
relational - in the context of safety management and treating safety as a mind-set rather than 
as processes and procedures might also improve practices and facilitate a more safety-aware 
culture within high hazard organisations.  
Our second contribution is to characterise nine dualities in how uncertainty emerges and how 
project managers analyse and act on it, building on earlier work (Reiman & Rollenhagen, 
2012) on the broader tensions and trade-offs in nuclear power projects. These nine dualities 
reflect the challenges and dilemmas involved in identifying and confronting project 
uncertainty.  Although the same dualities are observed in civil aerospace and nuclear projects, 
there are both similarities and some interesting differences between the two sectors in terms 
of how the dualities shape the emergence, analysis and responses to uncertainty.  
Both sectors exhibit a strong preference for data-based analyses of uncertainty, reflecting the 
techno-professional culture in these technically-complex and highly-consequential 
environments.  The analysis of uncertainty is always collective and collaborative.  Senior 
managers are generally active in the decision making process – which is typically open, 
structured and rich in robust debate and technical expertise.  The engineer stance (Vidal, 
2015) is very much in evidence here, with individuals modelling data, calculating or testing 
to help resolve uncertainties.  Our findings support work by Fischoff, Lichtenstein, Slovic, 
Derby, & Keeney (1981) that the combination of hard data and collective decision making is 
viewed as more objective than individual professional judgement, and a defence against 
blame in the remote possibility of a serious accident to an aircraft or a nuclear reactor.  Both 
sectors also exhibited a range of responses to uncertainty, some of which involved local 
solution, others which were system wide; some of which privileged the direction of travel and 
others which valued absolute location and a complete picture of the impact of the uncertainty 
on project timescales, budgets and client expectations.    
In the civil nuclear sector, uncertainty was more likely to emerge through the outworking of a 
project process and the response to it more likely to be proactive.  Respondents expected and 
accepted that their project environment was a highly uncertain one.  They sought out 
uncertainty using the extant processes and structures to achieve this (Kettunen, Reiman, & 
Wahlström, 2007).  If a process wasn’t available, then one would be developed.  This highly 
process orientated approach to uncertainty, whilst proactive and comprehensive also had an 
undesired consequence – that of slowing progress on projects, and leading to an inexorable 
shift of deadlines into the future.   
In civil aerospace projects uncertainty was more likely to emerge as a result of an unexpected 
incident, its presence was often initially denied and the eventual response was consequently 
more reactive.  This is a revealing and important finding, given the highly consequential 
safety-critical nature of civil aerospace projects. There are three possible explanations for 
this. First, there are greater and more immediate competitive pressures in civil aerospace than 
in the civil nuclear sector (Lofquist, 2010), which leads to increased schedule and cost 
pressure on the project team, which in turn can tempt practitioners to supress emerging 
uncertainties in pursuit of rapid aircraft or assembly development.  If progress on a nuclear 
decommissioning project slows in the UK, there are few alternative suppliers waiting to 
pounce and so fewer levers which clients can pull to drive progress. Also, in 
decommissioning projects a loss of time does not often lead to a detrimental impact on safety; 
often the safest course of action is to wait, allowing radioactivity to decay and new 
technologies for decommissioning to emerge.  
Secondly, learning happens in profoundly different ways in the two sectors. In civil aerospace 
the development programme and test environment is used to drive out uncertainties, with 
constant iterations of technology being tested (Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006), 
sometimes to destruction, and learning happening through experimentation and multiple 
explorations (akin to Pich et al., 2002).  There are few equivalents to the test environment in 
civil nuclear; instead learning occurs through theoretical analyses and modelling, and through 
a slow and steady process of characterisation. This involves robust debate through a multi 
stage peer review process, followed by cautious and conservative sign-off of any new designs 
or procedures (Kettunen et al., 2007).  No inter-containment buildings or nuclear materials, at 
least on a very large scale, are tested to destruction in the construction of a new nuclear 
power plant.   
Thirdly, the nature of the regulatory framework in the two sectors is different with civil 
aerospace governed by international criteria based regulations that govern when an aircraft is 
safe to fly.  In civil nuclear, the regulatory framework is country specific and evidence based.  
Operators have to demonstrate that a given technology or plant modification is safe before 
regulatory approval is given for its implementation.  An important practical implication of 
our work is that in spite of the different competitive and regulatory pressures in the two 
sectors, there is still scope for each to learn usefully from one another. The civil nuclear 
project management community can harness its strength in processes and strong safety 
culture by learning from civil aerospace to be more flexible, fleet of foot contractually and to 
encourage learning through experimentation.  Whilst the civil aerospace project community 
could work smarter not harder through its frenetic development programmes attending to, 
resourcing adequately and resolving project uncertainties earlier in the lifecycle before major 
issues blow up at huge financial and psychological cost.    
 
6. Conclusions 
6.1 Implications for practice 
Based on vignettes of 47 instances of project uncertainty on 9 large-scale safety-critical 
projects, we argue that project managers adopt a combination of behavioural, structural and 
relational modes when confronting project uncertainty.  This finding has a number of 
implications for the project management community.  First, it contributes important insights 
into how uncertainty emerges, is analysed and acted upon and the tensions that accompany 
this process in the highly-consequential and complex environment of the safety-critical 
project.   Secondly, acknowledging the presence of these tensions, and the dilemmas that 
ensue, should engender a more reflective approach to confronting uncertainty amongst 
project management practitioners, and a more deliberate process of uncertainty identification, 
analysis and action.  Thirdly, it shows that managing uncertainty requires a mind-set, which 
accepts uncertainty as an unavoidable fact of projects and uses all available people, practices 
and processes to drive out uncertainties as early as possible in the project lifecycle.  This may 
also include leveraging key relationships with project stakeholders, sponsors and team 
members, or utilising and adapting the extant project processes and structures to drive out 
uncertainty.  These are difficult skills to deploy, particularly in high hazard environments 
which are often inherently conservative.  Both civil nuclear and aerospace sectors need to 
consider how such skills and capabilities are encouraged, nurtured and retained amongst civil 
nuclear and aerospace project management communities.  Lastly, our findings should be 
transferable (Denscombe, 2010) to other safety-critical projects in civil nuclear and aerospace 
sectors, given that the sample is sufficiently large and varied to be representative of current 
UK based safety-critical projects in both sectors.   
 
6.2 Limitations and areas for future research 
One question that arises from this research is to what extent safety-critical projects are 
“special” and whether the findings can be transferred to a broader spectrum of less “extreme” 
project organisations.   Replicating this study in large-scale projects in a number of other 
important industry sectors, notably oil and gas, construction, healthcare and financial services 
would begin to answer this question.   The findings may also have wider implications for 
safety management practices.  Prior studies on building safe organisations have identified a 
number of factors that influence safety - notably structural factors, organisational leadership, 
effective decision making and communications (see for instance  Kettunen et al., 2007; Øien, 
Utne, Tinmannsvik, & Massaiu, 2011).  Extending our work to incorporate ‘vignettes” of 
safety issues; how they emerged, were analysed and acted upon – might illuminate similar or 
different approaches and dualities in the management of safety in high hazard organisations 
to those observed in contending with project uncertainty. 
There are number of limitations in the study which lead to further opportunities for research. 
First, although several respondents per project were interviewed, it was not possible to further 
triangulate the findings by accessing project documentation or undertaking participant 
observation.  Also, interview based accounts are one step removed from project management 
actuality (Cicmil, Williams, Thomas, & Hodgson, 2006). They tell us only how project 
managers account for how they identify and act on project uncertainty rather than how they 
might be observed to actually approach project uncertainty in a natural setting (Czarniawska, 
1998).  Future studies of an ethnographic nature undertaken by researchers who are 
embedded within project teams would therefore lead to further insights into the day-to-day 
project actuality of confronting project uncertainty.  
Secondly, data collection was a “snap-shot” based on one-off interviews.  A longitudinal 
study into whether approaches to managing uncertainty change over the project-lifecycle 
would be a fruitful avenue for future research. Thirdly, the study was UK centric, although all 
the projects were highly dependent on international supply chains.  Replicating the study 
across other geographical cultures, for example the US and Asia Pacific, which operate under 
different regulatory regimes, at least in the nuclear industry, might generate insights into the 
impact of national culture on how project managers deal with project uncertainty. 
Uncertainty is a fact of project life. Most decisions that are made on a safety-critical project 
involve uncertainty, the consequences of which may be highly significant to the safe and 
timely delivery of the project. Drawing attention to the structural, behavioural and relational 
approaches to project uncertainty and the tensions that manifest themselves in each approach, 
should enable the project management community to make progress in these “swampy 
lowlands” (Winter et al., 2006) of uncertainty where situations are often complex, rapidly 
changing and confusing, and yet where for reasons of safety failure is not an option.    
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